"The Bush Administration has proposed another vast new intrusion upon the privacy rights of every American in the name of the war on terrorism. The proposal is known officially as the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 2, or CAPPS2, for short. This proposed system is a quantum jump over the current system, known as CAPPS. The current system is not overly intrusive on airline passenger privacy. The current system uses a few indicators to decide if a potential airline passenger should be subjected to a more detailed preflight security inspection, or in some cases, be denied boarding altogether.
The current system uses the following criteria:
Did the passenger pay cash for the ticket? Did the passenger purchase the ticket at the last minute? Is the passenger going on a one-way trip? Does the passenger have any checked baggage? Does the passengers name appear on any airlines “do not fly list”? Does the passenger have the same name as a known terrorist(s)?
CAPPS1 uses objective criteria to single out people for more intense scrutiny. Consider the last 2 criteria. All airlines have a do not fly list. The people on the list can range from irate flyers that created disruptions in the passenger cabin, to people who were actually arrested at the end of a flight for criminal interference with the air crew. This is an objective standard used to deny someone boarding a plane. The same is true with a passenger whose name appears on a government list of terrorists. These are specific people who pose a demonstrated threat to anyone on an airplane. Even if a passenger is flagged under one of these criteria, the airline, under the current system will attempt to make sure that the passenger flagged is actually the person in the do not fly database. Frequently the passenger is not the actual person, and it is a case of a similar name.
The other criteria: one-way ticket, a cash purchased ticket, and a lack of checked baggage, is also interpreted with some discretion. Any one of these will probably not get you the third degree at airport security, but if all three apply to you, you will get a more intensive preflight screening. Even though these indicators are not perfect, there is some data to show that potential malevolent individuals have a higher probability of these characteristics in their airline ticket purchases. The big point with CAPPS1, is that there is no secrecy in the criteria and how it is applied, and private records of the traveling public are not ransacked to determine risk level.
CAPPS2 goes way past this. CAPPS2 allows the airline to go through your most private of information to compile a “risk assessment” of you, and depending what that assessment is, you will be allowed to board with a routine inspection, board with a enhanced inspection, or be denied boarding completely. What kind of information will CAPPS2 use to make this decision?
Your credit history. Your banking history. Your criminal record history – if any.
Public record information such as property ownership, automobile registrations, voter registrations, etc.
Does your name appear on a “do not fly list”? Do you have a name similar to that of a terrorist or other threat to “national security”? Does your name appear in an intelligence file?
Depending on the results of this screening, your boarding pass will be encoded with an encrypted message that will tell the airport security people if you will be allowed to pass through with a breeze, get the third degree, or be denied boarding completely.
So what is the big problem with all of this? Well consider your credit history. Now we will be establishing a link between someone's credit history and their eligibility to fly on a passenger plane. One really has nothing to do with the other. Do you want your credit history rummaged through because you bought a $79 nonrefundable ticket to see your mother in Seattle? The other questions that gets raised is if you have poor credit, will you be subjected to a more intense security screening because of it, or be denied boarding entirely. Then, what about the negative affect on your credit rating? Every time the airline accesses your credit report, it is listed as an inquiry, and will lower your credit score. If you fly a lot, you could develop bad credit as a result of “excessive inquiries” from airline prescreening. Another issue is what happens to this credit information once the airline has it? They will hang on to it for many years, and sell it to other companies and use it in marketing products and services to you – all without your permission or consent!
As bad as the credit data snooping is, the banking history screening is even worse. The idea of banking history screening came out of the notion that the 911 terrorists made certain suspicious purchases with debit cards and checks. So someone came up with the brilliant idea that if we can identify a pattern of purchases that a terrorist will likely make, we can then flag any person with similar purchasing patterns. This is an entirely new level of privacy invasion. All of your banking records would now be turned over to the airline screening system every time you buy a ticket, and heaven help you if your purchase patterns fit that of a terrorist.
Remember Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber/terrorist. He bought books on new identity – which apparently he did not read, books on explosives, bought a fake driver's license, rechargeable telephone cards, along with a large amount of ammonium nitrate. So what if his purchase pattern was placed into the CAPPS2 computers as a terrorist banking profile. A farmer who purchases books from Loompanics and uses rechargeable telephone cards could now be flagged by CAPPS2 as a potential terrorist. The danger of using patterns so broadly cannot be overstated. Many people were arrested in the aftermath of 911 simply because they bought an airline ticket or made hotel reservations from the same computer at a Kinkos or other Internet cafĂ© as one of the 911 hijackers.
This brings us to a passengers name getting into an intelligence file. You think” I certainly do not have to worry about that one,” but maybe you do. Intelligence files have a very low threshold for someone to be included. The threshold is much lower than the “probable cause” threshold of a police officer before making an arrest. You might find yourself in an intelligence file because in an online chat forum, you participated along with someone the feds suspected of being a terrorist. So everyone in the forum is now in an intelligence file. What if you happened to have a seat on an airplane or train or bus next to a person the feds were watching as a possible terrorism suspect? You are polite and strike up a conversation, and before you know it, you are in an intelligence file. Maybe the feds decide that writers of controversial books on privacy and identity also need to be included in an intelligence file because terrorists could use the information in those books to commit crimes? Hey! What happened to the first amendment – you know – freedom of the press?
The other problem with intelligence files is that you have no way of getting out of them. The flaccid privacy legislation we do have – the federal privacy act of 1974 – specifically exempts “national security” information. So once you are in, you are screwed.
Then consider the public record information. By compiling this data along with credit and banking data, we are coming very close to the airline having total knowledge of everything about your life. They will know the type of home you live in – condo, detached house, etc., and if you own or rent. From your vehicle registration data, they will know how many and what kind of vehicles you drive. Consider how something like this can trigger unforeseen consequences. A suspected terrorist sells a used car to a car dealer. You later purchase that car and register it in your name. The vehicle identification number of that car is in the government intelligence database as a car belonging to a terrorist. You are now denied aircraft boarding privileges because of this “link” to terrorism.
If you think this is a farfetched scenario, think again. Similar occurrences already happen at the U.S./Canadian border with the U.S. Customs services Big brother database called TECS2. Here is how it can, and does happen. A Canadian citizen from Vancouver is driving down to Seattle in a rented car. When he reaches the border at Blaine, Washington, the Immigration inspector sends him inside for “secondary” inspection. While undergoing secondary inspection, the immigration inspector discovers a conviction for driving while intoxicated from 15 years ago when the individual was 19. The Canadian is denied entry, and his name, birthdate, description, identification numbers, and the license plate number and province, are entered into the customs service computer. Two weeks later a different Canadian attempts to drive across the border in that same rental car. The immigration inspector runs the plate number, and immediately sends the unsuspecting Canadian into secondary. Maybe they let him in after a third degree search of his person, background and vehicle, or maybe they send him back too.
CAPPS2 destroys the privacy rights of anyone who flies. The government can maintain that is not mandatory – don't fly, and your privacy is not raped. But the reality is, most people have to fly when they travel. Trains no longer go everyplace like they did in the 1960s, and bus travel over long distances is unpleasant and time consuming. It is similar to the way the government has forced anyone with children to obtain Social Security numbers for them by the time they turn one year of age. No law forces a parent to get a Social Security number for his child. But, if you want to claim the child tax credit, the child must have a Social Security number. So unless you can afford not to claim the credit, you are forced to get the number for your child.
If you think we can count on the federal courts to protect us from this Orwellian nightmare, think again. The federal courts, and particularly the Supreme Court with its conservative majority, which will likely increase by at least one more member during Bush's term, have given broad deference to the federal government in the "war on terrorism." There will be no Supreme Court ruling reigning in this evisceration of the privacy rights of Americans. This battle will have to be waged in Congress, and surprisingly, the news is not all bad. The brakes have been put on CAPPS2 by Congress, it is not dead, but so many people have expressed outrage at the administration over this, that congress has imposed new hurdles that the administration will have to overcome for this system to ever come into place. Delta Airlines, which was testing the system at three unnamed airports, has suspended its activities after a website – www.boycottdelta.com – created a publicity nightmare for them.
I paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, “He who exchanges liberty for security has neither liberty nor security.” Nothing could be truer for CAPPS2. In fact, this system could increase the crime of identity theft, because terrorists and other “flight-challenged” individuals could simply steal the identities of people whom the system likes. The other way the system could be defeated is for potential terrorists to create an identity profile that the system will accept as a low risk individual. Or “sleeper cells” that the government is unaware of will have clean identities that will not create red flags in the system. The net effect of CAPPS2 will be to destroy the privacy rights of all Americans who fly with little or no effect on the terrorists it is supposed to stop."
This is what John said.
Tuesday, December 19, 2006
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